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Ab s tra ct 
An experiment was conducted to test whether dis counted repeated p lay 
leads to greater cooperation and coordination than one - shot play,  in a pub lic 
good environment with incomp lete information . The experiment was des igned so 
that , theoretically' repeate d p lay can sus tain equi libria with higher group 
earnings than result in the one - shot Bayes ian Nash equi librium . The des ign 
varied a number of environmental parameters , including the s ize o f  the group , 
the marginal rate of trans formation between the pub lic and private good , and 
the s tatis tical distribution of marginal rates of substitution between the 
pub lic and private good . Marginal rates of substitution were private 
information but the s tatistical distribution was common knowledge . The 
results indicate that repetition leads to greater cooperation , and that the 
magnitude of these gains depends both on the ab i lity of p layers to monitor 
each other ' s  strategy and on the underlying environmental parameters . 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The 
1 theory of repeated games has developed rapidly in the las t 10 
years . A common theme of the large body of work in this area is that 
repetition enables players to reach outcomes that would otherwise not be 
pos s ible . Of particular intere st is the fact that cooperative outcomes can 
be sus tained as noncooperative equilibria of repeated symmetric games even 
though they fail .to be .equiLihriurn ..outcomes in the stage - game . Competitive 
players can do better with repetition than without repetition . On the other 
hand , one difficulty of mos t  of this theory is that nearly everything can be 
supporte d  as an equilibrium in the repeated game , not only the cooperative 
outcome . Thus , to say that cooperation is a clear prediction of the theory 
is too s trong . Nevertheless , the suggestion that repetition of an asymmetric 
s tage game whose Nash equil ibria are not Pareto optimal will usually lead to 
better outcomes is widely viewed as an implication of the theory . 
As an empirical matter , this propos ition invites testing . The 
literature in experimental economics and experimental psychology contains 
2 many s tudies of finitely repeated games . In contras t ,  to our surprise few 
laboratory experiments have been conducted which attempted to induce an 
infinite horizon discounted supergame in a laboratory . In addition , there is 
a paucity of research on the corresponding one - shot games . 
What evidence there is about one - shot games comes either from the last 
round of play of a finitely repeated game with a known terminal period , or 
3 from exper iments where subj ects played the game only once . The former 
evidence (which generally indicates les s cooperation in the terminal period4) 
is suspect because , in the context of a repeated game it is difficult to 
distinguish between the use of trigger s trategies , as oppos ed to s imply 
myop ic one - shot play .  The latter evidence (virtually all of it in the 
context of public goods provis ion) Marwell and Ames [ 19 7 9 , 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 1 ] and 
S chneider and Pornrnerehne [ 1 9 8 1 ] is open to the critic ism that subj ects 
l acked sufficient task experience . In fact , inexperience has been 
demons trated to be an important factor in explaining cooperative play in 
these games ( Isaac , Walker and Thomas [ 1984]  and Andreoni [ 19 8 8 ] ) .  
An alternative , and we believe better , approach to s tudying one - shot 
games involves matching schemes so that each player ' s  opponents change from 
game to game . This has been used in auction games 5 ( Palfrey [ 1 9 8 5 ] ) ,
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bargaining games (Roth and Murnighan [ 19 8 2 ] , and elsewhere in s ituations 
where collus ion or supergame effects are thought to be potential problems 
(McKelvey and Palfrey [ 19 8 9 ] ) .  We have elsewhere us ed a vers ion of this 
des ign technique to s tudy one - shot public goods games ( Palfrey and Rosenthal 
[ 19 9 l a , 1 9 9 lb ] ) ,  and it is becoming the s tandard methodology for s tudying 
one - shot games . 
The experiment reported in this paper was designed exp l icitly to permit 
a careful comparison of one - shot games with the corresponding discounted , 
infinitely repeated games . .  The--experiment involved. over 200 hundred subj ects 
and thousands of s tage games, which varied in the ir p ayoff matrices , 
information conditions, number of players , and monitoring technologies . 
The bas ic s tage games p layed were all variants of a wel l - known N- person 
voluntary contribut ion public goods game where the product ion decis ion is 
b inary : a pub l ic good is produced i f  contributions exceed a threshold . The 
s tage game also has an element of private information , in that players have 
different , privately known marginal rates of substitution between the private 
good ( that they can use to contribute ) and the public good . In nearly all of 
the games , the symmetric equilibria of the s tage game are Pareto suboptimal 
becaus e of both a free - rider problem and a coordination problem ,  but Pareto 
improving outcomes are supportable in the repeated game . 
Roughly half of our data is generated by a repe ated des ign , in which a 
group of individuals play the same game repeatedly with a random s topping 
rul e . The other half of the data is a one - shot des ign ,  where individuals 
play the same game many t imes , but group assignments are randomly and 
anonymous ly reass igned after each game is played . 
We use our data to inves tigate to what extent , and in what ways , 
repeated games can improve the degree to which the players coordinate and 
.... 
produce the public good . The s tage game in fact pres ents two impediments to 
collective action as a result of the " threshold" nature of the pub l ic good 
technology . Firs t ,  a player who believes the threshold is being met by 
others f inds i t  in his interest to " free ride "  and not contribute . Second , a 
player who believes the threshold will not . be met , even with his 
contribution , finds it in his interest not to contribute . 
Players ' strategic calculations weigh these two dis incentives against 
the potential b enefit from obtaining the pub l ic good . S ince opportunities to 
explicitly coordinate are absent , it is reasonable to assume that players 
will only use symmetric s trategies represented by " cutpoints " :  if the value 
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of the private good is below the cutpoint , contr ibute; otherwise , do not . 
The stab le equilibria for such strategies , for the parameters we have chos en , 
either imp ly no contr ibution or relatively low rates of contribution . 
When the games are repeated ,  higher levels of contribution can be 
sustained ,  even when the players continue to use symmetric cutpoint 
strategies . The expectation of future reciprocation diminishes the effect of 
the current incentive to free ride . An even higher degree of coordination 
could be achieved if the players could get together and s ign a binding 
agreement. that .treated everyone .symmetrically . They could agree to always 
meet the contr ibution threshold exactly . A random device would determine who 
would contribute for each repetition of the stage game . Such an agreement 
would lead to ex ante efficient behavior . Decentralized vers ions of such 
agreements can always be sustained , for our parameters , in the repeated game 
(without contracting ) .  For example , we might observe rotation . In ,  say ,  a 2 
of 3 game , players " B "  and " C "  could contribute on the first round , "A" and 
" C "  on the second , "A" and " B "  on the third , "B"  and " C "  on the fourth , and 
so on . Alternatively , the players might separate , asymmetrically , into sets 
of "contributors " and "non- contributors . "  
The above discus s ion suggests three distinct patterns of behavior that 
one might expect to observe under repeated play :  
1 .  Symmetric cutpoints higher than the one - shot cutpoints . 
2 .  Separation into roles of contributor and free - rider . 
3 .  Rotation schemes . 
The expected patterns of behavior that would be exhib ited under these 
three different solutions to the inefficiency problem are very different 6, 
with the exception of unanimity games (where all of the private good is 
required for production of the public good) . In this case , the three 
varieties col lapse into a s ingle repeated play equil ibrium where all 
contribute . 
What we ob serve .in the repeated laboratory games is clos est to the first 
two of these three patterns. On average , individuals contribute more under 
the repeated- game treatment than in the one - shot treatment . Al though there 
is greater variance acros s individuals in the ir contribution rates in 
repeated games than in one shot games , there is only very weak evidence 
indicating the second pattern . Indeed , only a few subj ects were pure or 
3 
almos t pure free r iders and no subj ect was a pure contributor . We do not 
observe any group rotation schemes that would support the third pattern . 
Only one individual rotated throughout an entire repeated game session . His 
behavior was not reciprocated by the other members of his group; they used 
s imp le cutpoint s trategies . While a few individuals at times may have 
attempted to encourage other players to rotate by sys tematically alternating 
their own contr ibution choices , these attempts invariab ly fail . Our results 
contras t sharply with results for analogous symmetric two-person games with 
complete .information,. wher.e .e£ficien:t . .  alternation .. often emerges after only a 
few repetitions ( Prisbrey 1 9 9 1 ) . 
We suspect that , without communication , the coordination problem is too 
comp licated to overcome s imply by repeated play .  Even with communication , 
the coordination prob lem is by no means easy to overcome . In a one-shot game 
with prepl ay communication , Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 19 9 la) find no efficiency 
gain compared with no communication . In one-shot battle of the sexes games , 
Cooper et al . ( 1 9 8 9 )  find increased efficiency with one-way communication , 
where the communicator effectively chooses the asymmetric equilibrium that 
favors her . Ne ither Palfrey and Rosenthal nor Cooper et al . have a 
repeated-game des ign ,  so alternation schemes are not pos s ible . 
Indeed , we find that the extent to which repeated play improves over 
one-shot p l ay appears to be small . Not only do earnings fail to reach the ex 
ante efficient level that could be produced by rotat ion , they general ly fail 
to reach the level that could be achieved by symmetric cutpoint strategies .  
In contras t ,  aggregate earnings in the one-shot play setting are almos t 
perfectly predicted by the noncooperat ive solution ( Palfrey and Rosenthal , 
1 9 9 la) . This contras t between our one-shot and repeated play results is not 
encouraging news for those who might wish to interpret as gospel the 
oft-spoken sugges tion that repeated play with discount rates close to 1 leads 
to more cooperative behavior . True enough , it does--but not by much . 
Perhaps this is not surprising , given both the general difficulty of 
free rider prob lems and the difficulty of the coordination p roblem in the 
experiment we .conducted . .  After -all , our experimental games had more than two 
players , incomplete information ,  and , in some cases , multiple symmetric 
equilibri a  in the one-shot game . The power of repeated play might be more 
forceful in s impler experimental environments . But we suspect that the power 
of repeated p lay is , if anything , even less forceful in the more complex 
natural s e ttings that we are ultimately trying to understand . While repeated 
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play makes possible cooperative gains , other ingredients are also needed for 
the lion ' s share of these gains to be reaped . 
2. THE EXPERIMENTAL DES I GN 
The subj ects us ed in the experiment were 228  students recruited from the 
campus es of Carnegie�Mellon .Univers ity 1 ...California Ins titute of Technology , 
and Pasadena Communi ty College . Except where noted in Table 1 ,  each sess ion 
was run on networked personal computers that . Subj ects participated in a 
sequence of three sess ions , one immediately following the other . 7 Component 
sess ions in a triple sess ion typically emp loyed different treatments ( for 
example , a change in the parameters) . Table 1 provides the details . Each 
subj ect was paid privately in cash immediately following the final session .  
A triple sess ion lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours , including the 
prel iminaries ( ins tructions , questions and answers , quiz , and practice 
rounds ) .  No subj ect participated in more than one triple session . Some 
Cal tech subj ects had prior experience with computerized double auction market 
experiments . 
[Table 1 about here . ]
In a typ ical s e s s ion , 12 subj ects 8 were seated at terminals ,  separated 
by partitions , and ass igned identification numbers . Ins tructions were read 
1 d h . 9a ou to everyone at t e same time . Each sess ion was divided into a 
sequence of periods ( or rounds ) . In each period , the group of 1 2  subj ects 
was either divided into four three - person groups or three four - person groups . 
Each group then independently played the following game . 
THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
Each subj ect was endowed with a " token" , with value of c Francs ( an i 
artificial laboratory· currency with a publ icly known dollar - exchange rate ) . 
The computer screen displayed the individual ' s  token value but not the token 
values ·of other group members . Thus , prior to play of a s tage ga�e ,
individual token values were always private information . Subj ects were told 
that they could either " spend" the ir own token or "keep " it . If  at least W 
subj ects in a group chose " spend" , then each member in the group earned V 
5 
Francs . In addition , nonspenders ( "keeper " subj ects ) also earned their token 
values . I f  there were fewer than W spenders in the group , spenders earned 0 
and nonspenders earned their token values . Token values were drawn 
independently from a uniform distribution us ing a random device on the 
computer in one - franc increments between 1 and a known maximum token value , 
C .  This distribution was publ icly announced and explained to all subj ects 
during the instruction period . 
To insure that , insofar as pos s ible , all aspects of the game except for 
the exact draws of token .values and the -personal identities of the other 
members in the group were common knowledge , we used the following procedure . 
Firs t ,  the rules were publ icly announced in great de tail . S econd , two 
practice games were played , to help the subj ects famil iarize themse lves with 
the keyboard and the computer screen . Third , a quiz was given after the 
practice rounds . Any incorrect answers by a subj ect were corrected in 
private , and then the correct answers were read aloud and explained to all 
subj ects , together . 
After the quiz , the first ( s tage ) game began . After every subj ect had 
made a spending decis ion , all subj ects were tol d  what the other members in 
their group did , their payoffs were calculated for them , and the sess ion then 
proceeded to the next game (period) . In the new game , subj ects ' new token 
values were again drawn randomly by the same procedure as the las t game , 
independently from past draws . During the course of the experiment , subj ects 
could press "H"  on the ir terminals and obtain a history of the p lay of the 
last 2 5  games they had participated in under the current treatment . 
EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS 
In terms of treatments , the des ign is compl icated and multifactorial , 
and nons quare . There were two primary treatments variables : the parameters of 
the game , and whether the groups were randomly reass igned after each round or 
were fixed for the entire session .  The sess ions where groups were randomly 
reass i gned after e ach play of the game approximate the case of " one - shot " 
play of the game . The sess ions where groups were fixed approximate the case 
of " repeated" play .  
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A .  PARAMETERS 
The parame ter treatment was three dimens ional , s ince we varied the 
threshold , W ,  the group s ize , N ,  and the maximal marginal rate of 
subs ti tut ion of the private good for the public good , C .  
different parameter conditions were used . 
B .  RANDOM GROUPS VS . FIXED GROUPS 
A total of s ix 
In the " repeated" condition , each subj ect was as s igned to a group whose 
membership was the same in every game of that treatment . I f  more than one 
fixed - group treatment was used in a " triple sess ion" , then group membership 
changed between sess ions so that individuals were as signed to a new group 
with a completely different membership . Except for this piece of 
information , subj ects were told nothing about the identities of the other 
members of their group . 
The repeated game us ed a random stopp ing rule to determine when the 
sess ion would end . Each sess ion began with 20 games . After the twentieth 
game , a 10 - s ided die was rolled , and the sess ion ended if a 4 was rolled . 
Otherwise , the sess ion continued on to the 21st game . The rolling of the die 
f 11 d th ft t·1 4 f .  11 rolled . 10 o owe every game erea er , un i a was ina y 
In the random- group condition ( or " one - shot"  condition) , subj ects were 
randomly reass igned to a new group after every game . They were never told 
the identity of current , future , or past group members . Each random 
treatment sess ion lasted a fixed number of games , either 20 , 2 5 , or 3 0 , and 
subj ects were always informed of this fixed number at the beginning of the 
s e s s ion . 
C .  THE "REVEAL" TREATMENT: PERFECT VS . IMPERFECT MONITORING 
In addition , there was a secondary treatment variable , called " reveal " .  
In some of the sess ions , after a game was played , subj ects were informed not 
only what everyone in their group chose but also what the ir exact , token 
values had been . Sess ions where we did this are referred to as " reveal " 
sess ions , and other sess ions are called "no reveal " sess ions . The motivation 
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for the reveal/no - reveal manipulation is that theory suggests cooperati on 
will be eas ier to sus tain when the token values are revealed after each game , 
allowing subj ects to more accurate ly monitor the other subj ects ' s trategies . 
This monitoring permits a richer class of trigger strategies , which may be 
used to sus tain higher contribution rates . In contras t ,  optimal rotation 
schemes can be supported even if token values are not revealed after each 
play o f  the s tage game . This is discus sed in more depth in the next s ection . 
Table 1 summarizes relevant des ign information for all sess ions , with 
one -shot .s ess ions .shown in Table. lA and repeated- game sess ions in lB . 
3. EQUILIBRIUM
In what follows , without loss of generality ,  we as sume that the value of 
the public good , V ,  is the same for every player , and normal ize it at 1 .
Therefore , the marginal rate o f  substitution between the private good and the 
public good for individual i is s imply equal to i ' s token value . 11 
A " cutpo int rule"  for player i is a s trategy with the property that 
A 1 2  there exis ts a critical cos t , ci , with the property that i spends if and A only i f  c s c . i i 
BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE ONE - SHOT GAME 
In the one - shot game , it is easy to show that a cutpo int s trategy is an 
optimal response for player i ,  given any s trategy profile of the other 
players in the group . Therefore , we restrict attention to such s trategies in 
our analys i s  of the one - shot game . The equilibrium to this game has been 
derived in Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 19 8 8 , 199la , 19 9 lb ) ;  the reader is referred 
to thos e  p apers for details . 1 3  
The basic features of the equil ibrium are a s  fo llows : 
- - I f  W > 1 then there always exists an equil ibrium where all players 
adopt a cutpo int c* = 0 .  That is , no one ever spends . Thi s  is never true if 
w = 1 .
- - If W 
i f  c s 1 .  
N ,  then there exists another equilibrium at c* C ,  if and only 
- - The other equilibria are characterized as the set of all c* between 0 
and 1 that s atisfy the equation: 
c* = Q(c* , W , N , C ) ( 1 )  
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where Q is the probability that a player is pivo tal; this is the probabil ity 
that exactly W- 1 out of the N- 1 other players contribute , given that they are 
us ing the cutpo int rule c* , and given that the ir token values are uniformly 
distributed between 0 and C .  The exact formula for Q is : 
Q ( c* , W , N , C ) 
(N- 1 )  ! ( ) W- 1 ( ) N-Wc* C - c* 
(W- l ) !(N -W) ! C- -C-
( 2 )  
- - For all experimental parameters with W < N ,  there is exactly one 
solution to ( 2 )  with O<c*<l . This solution is " globally expectationally 
s table"  ( Palfrey and Rosenthal , 199lb ) , while the c* = 0 equil ibrium is 
uns table . 
- - I f W = N ,  then c*=O is the unique globally expectationally stab le 
equil ibrium for the experimental values of C .  
Summariz ing , for all parameter values of the games reported in this 
paper , there is a unique stable Bayes -Nash equil ibr ium to the one - shot game . 
THE REPEATED GAME 
We analyze the repeated game as if it is an infinitely repeated game 
with a discount factor of . 9 .  While the random s topp ing rule we used does 
no t exactly correspond to this , it is very close . The fact that the 
probability of s topp ing was equal to 0 for the first 1 9  plays of the game 
s imply means that any supergame payoffs that could be supported with a 
discount factor of . 9  could also be supported if there is no discounting for 
the first 19 rounds , followed by a cons tant discount factor o=0 . 9 .  We as sume 
everyone is risk neutral . This assumption was wel l  supporte d ,  in terms of 
aggregate earnings , in the one - shot experiments . 
Optimal Rotation Schemes . 
Firs t , we show that at o=O . 9 ,  it is pos s ible to support the payoffs 
ass ociated with an optimal rotation scheme . This is done by demons trating 
that a player with a token value of G is better off spending rather than 
keep ing in the current round , if spending leads to a perpetual continuation 
of an optimal rotation scheme , but keep ing leads to the wors t possible
one - sho t Bayes - Nash equil ibrium in every future period . Such a punishment 
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scheme is subgame perfect . 
Case 1: W = 1 N = 3 
In the optimal rotation scheme , an individual will have to contr ibute 
c every third game , and will give up a token value worth an expected 2· In the 
other two games , a p ayoff of 1 will be earned . I f  a player contributes when
it is his turn to do so , his current payoff will be 1 - c, , which is always 
1 
gre ater than or equal to 1 - C .  If  the player does no t contribute , then his 
payoff wil l  be equal to O . .  in �the .current game , and the value of the worst 
one - shot Bayes ian equilibrium in every future period . 
Therefore , the value of contributing if c = C equals: i 
and the value of not contributing equals: 
v NC = 0 + S [-.!_] ( l+S+S2) V  1 - 63 0 
where V is the expected value o f  the worst ( one - shot) Bayes -Nash 0 
equil ibrium . 
From ( 1 )  and ( 2 ) , we get 
where c* is the unique solution to ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  between 0 and 1 . In our 
experiments , C = 1 . 5  and S = . 9 .  Substitution into the formulas for V and 
V shows V > V NC C NC 
c 
The analys is is comparable , but s impler , when W > 1 ,  s ince the value 
VNc' of deviating from the equil ibrium path equals 0 .  
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Case 2: W = 2 N = 3 
In this case , alternation requires each member of the group to spend two 
thirds of the time and keep one third of the time . S o , a typ ical pattern of 
contribution will go : SSKSSKSSK . . .  Therefore , V is smallest in a round wherec 
i ' s  current token value equals C ,  and he mus t spend the next round as wel l . 
S imple algebra gives 
vc = 1
�
0
3 [1-�s(1-�)+s2] - �
= .J:_[(l+o+o2)-�(1+5+1-o3)] > 0
1-53 2 
For 5 .9, this reduces to the condition :
c < 5.412.17
which is s atis fied for the experimental values of C .
Case 3: W = 3 N = 3 
� c < 2 [ 1+5+523] l+o+l-o 
As before , we evaluate the value of contributing if the token value is 
c .  
v = 1 - c + -0-(1-�)c 1-o 2 
Thus V > 0 � 5 > 2 - �c c This holds for the experimental values of C .
Case 4: W = 2, N = 4. 
Here , individuals mus t contribute every other round . This means : 
v 1 ( 1-�s) c - 2 c 1-52 
� c ::5 2(1+5) 
and substituting o=0 . 9  gives : 
2-52 
C 3.8 ::5 --1.19 
� 0 
This is satis fied for the experimental value , C 
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2.25. 
Optimal Asymmetric Contribution Rates Without Rotation 
The optimal rotation schemes descr ibed above have the property that , 
even though the payoffs to the players are not perfectly symmetric (because 
the first contributor e arns a l ittle less on average than the second and 
third contributors ) , they are very nearly equal . In fact , if a die could be 
rolled to determine the rotation order , then they would be " fair "  in the 
sens e of giving all members of the group the same ex ante payoff . 
The expected _ _gr.oup ... p.ayoff . f.r.om . .J:'O-tation . .  can be equaled if the same 
subset of W members of the group always spends in every round , effectively 
dividing the group into two subgroups , which we call " activists " and 
" free - riders " .  Of course , the activists in the group would earn much les s 
14 than the free riders in the group . In the W=2 , N=3 game , an equil ibrium 
with two activists , who both always spend , and one free r ider , can be 
supported for the experimental parameter C=l . 5 ,  but not for C=2. 25.  In the 
W=l , N=3 game , one cannot support an equilibrium that involves one activis t  
and two free riders , but an infinite alternation between two activis t  players 
with the third player always be ing a free rider can be supported in the 
supergame for o= . 9 .  A s imilar solution can be supported in the W=2 , N=4 , 
C=2 . 25 game with 1 free r ider and 3 activists . 
One may ask the more general question of what the optimal asymmetric 
arrangement is , that is also s tationary , in the sens e that each player ' s  
s trategy along the equil ibrium p ath depends only on his current token value , 
and not upon the current time period . I t  is fairly e asy to show that such 
s trategies always take the form of a vector of cutpo ints , one for each of the 
players . For the W=l , N=3 games , the W=2 , N=4 games , and the W=2 , N=3 , C=l . 5
games , the optimal asymmetric solution i s  the one j ust given . For the 
remaining parameter condition (W=2 , N=3 , C=2 . 2 5 ) , we do not derive the 
optimal asymmetric cutpo ints , but conj ecture that for these treatments , there 
is no equil ibrium asymme tric arrangement that does better than the op timal 
symmetric cutpoints discus sed in the next s ection . 
S ince with the ex-eeption -of -the last condition , these optimal asymmetric 
vectors of cutpo ints divide the members of the group into one set of players 
who always free ride and a second set of activists , the equil ibrium 
s trategies can b e  monitored under both the " reveal " and the "no - reveal " 
treatments . This is true of the ro tation schemes , as wel l , s ince the trigger 
strategies only require knowledge of the past moves of the other players in 
1 2  
the group . 
Optimal Symmetric Contribution Rates Without Rotation 
Final ly , we show that in the " reveal " treatment , another kind of 
15 cooperative solution can be supported with repeated play. For any given set 
of parame ters , one can compute a unique value c** , called the efficient group 
cutpo int , that. repres ents . 1:ha.hest .synunetric .cutpo int rule f.or the group as a 
whole . In other words , if everyone uses the cutpoint c** , then , ex ante , 
each individual earns more than he would under any other rule that 
as s igns a common cutpoint to all p layers . 
In the case of W=N this obviously coincides with the optimal rotation 
scheme. However , when W < N ,  this rule wil l  yield lower total expected 
ff h h h . 1 . h 16 b h .  h ff payo s to t e group t an t e optima rotation sc eme , ut ig er payo s 
than the best of the Bayes - Nash equilibria to the one - shot game . These 
arrangements also generally lead to lower payoff than the optimal asymme tric 
cutpoint rules . Table 2 summarizes these optimal symmetric cutpo ints for all 
the experimental parameters . It  is an easy exercise to show that , for any of 
our experimental parameters , they are supportable as supergame equilibria for 
o= . 9 ,  if the punishment phas e invo lves reverting to the worst one - shot 
Bayes - Nash equil ibrium .  
[Table 2 about here . J
However ,  if the cutpo int arrangement calls for a cutpoint lying s trictly 
between 0 and C ,  then a monitoring is sue arises . When a player fails to 
contribute in a round , the other members of the group need to know his token 
value in order to ascertain whether the arrangement has been violated , s ince 
punishment is appropriate only for "keepers " with token values below the 
cutpo int . This is no t a problem in the " reveal treatment , s ince players are 
provided with the necessary information . But in the "no - reveal " treatment , 
the s impl e  trigger s trategies we have been cons idering will not work . Thus , 
the analysis  here only .holds for the " reveal " treatment . We have not worked 
out the optimal asymme tric contribution rates that can be supported when 
token values are no t revealed after each round. The one limited observation 
we can make is that the "no reveal " repeated games typ ically cannot support 
group payoffs as high as the " reveal " treatment. 
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4. HYPOTHESES
PAYOFFS 
The central is sue addressed in this p aper is whether the play of a 
supergame leads to more effic ient outcomes than in the one - sho t play of the 
s tage game . Accordingly , the first set of hypotheses focus es on differences 
between ( normal ized) per - subj e ct earnings in the one -sho t game sess ions and 
the repeated ses s ions . 
Hl. Earnings are higher in the repeated sessions than in the one-shot 
sessions. 
S e cond , we have a hypothesis , sugges ted in the previous section , 
relative to the se condary reveal/ no reveal treatment . This hypothes is is 
motivated by the idea that a greater ab ility for players to monitor the 
s trategies of the other players in the group will lead to more cooperation : 
H2. Earnings are higher in reveal treatments than in no reveal treatments, 
holding parameters constant. 
Final ly , there are several hypotheses about how wel l  the theoretical 
models predi ct .  The equil ibria computed in the last section lead to some 
very spe ci fi c  hypotheses about earnings . For the one - shot games there is a 
s ingle hypothesis : 
H3. Earnings in the one-shot sessions are consistent with the predictions of 
the one-shot Bayesian equilibrium model. 
For the repeated- game sess ions , there are several natural pos s ibilities 
to fo cus on . One is that repetition makes no difference , and that the 
one - shot B ayesian equilibrium predicts the experimental data in the repeated 
sessions , j us t  as it is predicted to do in the one - shot sess ions . Two other 
pos s ib i li t ies are indicated from the repeated game analys is in the last 
s e ction : ( 1 )  rotation; and ( 2 )  optimal symmetric cutpo ints . These are 
summarized in hypotheses 4 - 6 . 
H4. Earnings in the .repeated sessions are consistent with the predictions of 
the one-shot Bayesian equilibrium model. 
HS. Earnings in the repeated sessions are consistent with the predictions of 
the optimal rotation equilibrium. 
H6. Earnings in the repeated sessions are consistent with the predictions of 
the optimal symmetric cutpoint equilibrium. 
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SPENDING 
At first glance this may seem like the same quest ion as efficiency , but 
it is no t .  While our theoreti cal model leads dire ctly to 6 hypotheses that 
paral lel Hl-H6. with the word " earnings " replaced by " spending rates " ,  tests 
of the spending hypotheses are no t equivalent to tests of earning hypotheses .
In our public goods game , an increase in spending that does not result in the 
threshold be ing met de cre.as .es .. e££iciency . .as _does .an increase in spending that 
results in contribution above the threshold level . Even when the thre sho ld 
is met exactly , if W<N , effi ciency is greater if the low token value 
individuals are the spenders . 
A wel l - known theoretical feature of the supergame is that there exis t  an 
infinity of equilibria that can support a large range of payoffs to the 
players . A gl impse of this variety is evident in the previous section . On 
the other hand , in the one - shot game there is a unique predi ction of a s tab le 
equilibrium .  Thus an additional hypothesis concerns dispers ion of spending 
rates : 
H7. Spe nding rate s are more dispe rsed in the re pe ate d se ssions than in the 
one -shot se ssions. 
This hypothesis  is motivated by at least three theoretical 
cons iderations : 
( 1 )  Because there are mul tiple equil ibria to the repeated game , group and 
individual earnings may be dispersed , even if all groups exhib it equilibrium 
behavior , s ince different groups may select different e quilibri a .  
( 2 )  Individuals in a group may adopt strategies that are part of some 
equi librium , but not all individuals choose the same equilibrium . 
( 3 )  The s earch for coordination in the repeated game leads to subs tantial 
out of equi l ibrium behavior , with different players trying different 
s trategies .  
( 4 )  There exist asymmetric equilibria in the supergame , 
STRATEGIES 
There are several alternative hypotheses about the kinds of s trategies 
individuals might be adopting , and about how these s trategies might differ 
between the one - shot and repeated sess ions . With respect to the one - shot 
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sess ions , three predictions fo llow immediately from the Bayes ian equilibrium 
model and these  are s tated ( in order of how s trong the prediction is ) as 
hypotheses 8 - 1 1 .  
HS. (DOMINANCE) Individuals neve r spe nd tokens if the toke n value e xce e ds 1. 
H9. (CUTPOINTS) Individuals adopt cutpoint strate gie s, which may vary across 
parametric tre atments. 
HlO. (SYMMETRY) All individuals adopt ide ntical cutpoints within a give n 
parame tric tre atme nt. 
Hll . .  (EQUILIBRIUM) . .IndividuaJ.s.--adopt-the .. cutpoint strategie s e qual to the 
one s pre dicted by the Baye sian e quilibrium mode l. 
S trategies in the repeated game are potentially more comp l icated because 
the s trategy space is richer . Also , the dominance hypothes is is less 
compell ing , s ince spending a token with a value greater than 1 is no longer a 
dominated action . For example rotation schemes will have players 
contributing when the ir token values exceed 1. 
S imilarly , the arguments for cutpo ints are less compelling as well . In 
the one - shot game , best responses to any s trategies by the other members of 
your group are always in the form of a cutpo int s trategy . This i s  not true 
in the repeated games , with the obvious examples being the use o f  rotation 
schemes and punishment schemes as part of an equil ibrium strategy . 
Nevertheless , such strategies are compelling partly because they cons titute 
very s impl e  decis ion rules . 
For the same reas ons that were given for Hypothes is 7 ,  we expect more 
variation in cutpo int s trategies in the repeated sess ions . Finally , s ince 
there are s o  many pos s ible equilibria besides the one - shot Bayes ian 
equil ibrium , we expect the one shot Bayesian equilibrium model to perform 
less wel l  with the repeated- game data than with the one - shot data . Thus , 
compared to the one - shot games , we expect Hypotheses 8 - 11 to have less 
support in the repeated games . 
Finally , there are some hypotheses about individual b ehavior that are 
specific to the repeated sess ions . Do subj ects adopt rotation s trategies ? 
Do some subj ects act -as complete " free riders " ,  as the optimal asymmetric 
solution s omet imes predicts ? Are some subj ects " activists " ?  
adopt .cutpo ints equal to the optimal symmetric cutpoint? 
hypotheses are s tated below as hypotheses 1 2 - 14 .  
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Do subj ects 
These final 
Hl2. (ROTATION) Subje cts follow rotation strate gie s. 
Hl3. (ACTIVISTS) In the K=l, N=3 and the K=2, N=3, C=l. 5 parame tric 
treatments, subjects se parate into two groups: activists and free ride rs. 
Hl4. (OPTIMAL SYMMETRIC MODEL) Cutpoints in the re pe ate d game se ssions are 
close r to the optimal symme tric cutpoint than to the one-shot Baye sian 
e quilibrium cutpoint. 
5. DATA
Efficiency: Doe s Repe tition He lp? 
In order to compare effic ienc ies across parametric treatments , we 
convert the actual earnings by subj ects into an efficiency index . This is 
done by subtracting the endowments ( token values )  from earnings paid at the 
end of the sess ion , and then dividing these net earnings by the ( net)  
earnings that would have resulted ( conditioning on the actual token value 
draws ) if everyone had used the group - optimal symmetric cutpo int . 1 7  This 
results in a normalization that will equal 0 if no one ever contributes , and 
will equal 1 if everyone contributes us ing the group - op timal symme tric 
cutpo int s trategy . 
The averages are taken over rounds 6 to 20 . The first 5 rounds were 
excluded to contro l  for inexperience and learning . Rounds 2 1  and higher in 
the repeated- game treatments were excluded to preserve comparabil ity between 
the one - shot and repeated experiments . 18 
To address Hl, that earnings are higher in the repeated- game sess ions , 
we aggregate all earnings within a parameter treatment . A comparison of the 
predictions of the different theoretical models is summarized in Table 2 .  
The observed effic iencies , comparing one - shot games and repeated- games are 
reported in Table 3 .  
[Table 3 about here . ]
Except for the W=l , N=3 game , the results clearly show that repetition 
helps . This is especially strong in the W=3 , N=3 , C=l . O  game and in the W=2 , 
N=3 , C=l . 5 game . The treatment differences for W=l , N=3 are very small �nd 
s tatis tically ins ignificant but in the wrong direction , in that the one - shot 
sess ions were more efficient . 
There is a plaus ible ex post rationale to explain why this might have 
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happened .  This game i s  the mos t  competitive , in the sense that the gains 
from cooperation are the leas t .  This fact i s  reflected in the small 
difference between predicted per capita earnings in the one - sho t Bayesian 
equil ibrium ( 1 . 3 5 )  and per cap ita earnings with a group - optimal cutpo int 
( 1 .  44) . 1 9  With little separation between the predictions for the so 
cooperative vs . noncooperative outcomes , it is not surpris ing that we 
measured e s s entially no difference between the one - sho t and repeated-play 
efficiencies in the W=l , N=3 game . The differences are greater in magnitude 
and in the right direction- for---all -of - the other parametric treatments . In 
fact , all these o ther differences are significant at the . 01 level . 
The hypothes is H2 is tes ted by comparing the effic iency measures for the 
reveal and the nonreveal treatments as shown at the bottom of Table 3 .  
Revelation of token values after each play raised efficiency in all four 
parameter treatments where we ran reveal as wel l  as non - reveal sess ions . But 
one feature of these results is perplexing . Revelation makes i ts b iggest 
impact in 3 o f  3 games . But , as explained above , theory predicts 
that monitoring should have no effect in these games . 
A more detailed examination of the 3 of 3 ,  C=l . O  games sugges ts that the 
magnitude o f  the reveal effect is not large . We ran ( see Table 1 )  s ix 
sess ions with these parameters . Four of these sess ions occurred in two 
triple sess ions . In the two 8/3/8 9 sess ions , earnings were actually 
s l ightly less in the reveal treatment . In the two 10/2 9/91 sess ions , 
earnings were virtually identical in the two treatments . So the difference 
between Reveal and No Reveal rests solely on the 6/11/91 sess ion , in which 
all three groups coordinated fully from round three onward , having much 
higher earnings than the 9/4/9 1 sess ion , when there was a very low degree of 
coordination . Thus it is poss ible that there cohort effects may be 
magnifying the reveal effect . On the other hand , there is some support for 
the increased efficiency from token revelation in the data for the W=N=3 , 
C=l . 5 experiments . The two reveal sess ions were on 6/11/9 1 .  Subj ects in 
these sess i ons not only did better than the subj ects in the No Reveal setting 
of 9/4/91 but also bettered· the 10/29/9 1 subj ects who , as j us t  reported 
above , achieved a high degree of coordination in the unanimity game with C=l . 
Data that bear on hypotheses H3-H6 are summarized in Figures 1 and 2 and 
Table 4 .  On the horizontal axis of Figure 1 ,  we plot , for the random group 
treatment , the theoretical prediction of earnings , aggregated for a session , 
and us ing the actual token values drawn in the s e s s ion . Each of the 2 2  
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sess ions are plotted twice , once for the one - shot cutpoint prediction and 
once for the group optimum cutpoint prediction . I f  a theory were prec isely 
correct , at the aggregate level , all the po ints would lie on the 
" Predicted=Actual " (45°) line . To grasp the scale of the figure , the
normal ized value of C varies from 1 to 2 .  2 5  across treatments , so average 
endowments vary from 0 .  5 to 1 . 12 5 . Thus an increase in earnings above 
endowments of 0 . 5 is quite subs tantial . [Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
The Baye s ian one - shot predictions -clus ter quite 
0 clos ely ab out the 45 
l ine . The Root Mean Square Error ( RMS E )  of the theoretical predictions is 
only 0 . 09 .  ( See Table 4 . ) The average deviation of the theoretical 
prediction from actual earnings is only - 0 . 02 ,  showing that , over all the 
sess ions , there is only a slight tendency to under predict earnings . In 
contras t ,  the optimal symmetric cutpo ints are , as expected , much worse for 
random groups . The average deviation is 0 . 2 6 1 , showing that the cooperative 
model overpredicts earnings subs tantially . Resul ts for the Rotation model 
are s l ightly worse ( For our parameters there is no difference in predicted 
earnings between the Optimal and Rotation predictions for W=N=3 and only 
slight differences for some other parameters . )  [Table 4 about here] 
Figure 2 reports the repeated games data in a s imilar way . With respect 
to fixed groups , the one - shot model no longer provides a tight match to the 
data . The RMS E  more than doubles . Underprediction is more subs tantial; the 
average deviation increases to - 0  . 13 .  As can be seen in Figure 2 ,  the 
failure of the one - shot model here is largely the reflection of three 
sess ions where the theoretical prediction is zero increase over the endowment 
but where the subj ects actually gained nearly 0 . 5 .  These all repres ent 
W=N=3 , C=l experiments where all groups perfectly or nearly perfectly 
coordinated in Rounds 6 through 2 0 . 
mode l is still reasonably accurate . 
For the other parameters , the one - shot 
Indeed , the op timal symmetric cutpoint model does no t fit the data 
b etter than the -one - shot mode l . I t  continues to overpredict earnings , 
although by less than wi th random groups , but the RMSE is in fact s l ightly 
higher than that for the one - shot model . Again , rotation is the worst of the 
three models . These results again indicate that repeated play increases 
earnings , but only by a small fraction of the theoretically pos s ible gain . 
Moreover , while , game theory is a highly accurate model of aggregate behavior 
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in one - sho t games , no game theoretic model adequately captures repeated play .  
Repeated play might produce results closer to the optimum predictions if 
the Reveal treatment were used in all settings . ( But see the caveat in the 
discus s ion above . )  When we regress actual earnings agains t those predicted 
with the optimal cutp o int , a cons tant , and a dummy variable for Reveal , we 
find that earnings are , certeris paribus , 0 .  090 normalized units higher in 
the Reveal treatment ( t - s tatistic = 1 . 8 7 9 , p -value =0 . 03 ) . But , as can be 
seen visually in Figure 2 ,  even if subj ects do better in Reveal treatments , 
they s till tend .. to .. earn . . less -than .would be availab le with the optimal 
symmetric cutpoint . 
Spending: Does Repetition Lead to More Contribution? 
. For all 6 of our parameters sets , repetition clearly leads to more 
contribution , as shown in Tables 3 and 5 .  Five of the s ix s ets show 
s tatis tically significant differences over rounds 6 to 2 0 . The data also 
support H7, that spending rates also tend to be more dispersed with repeated 
play ,  particularly for W=N=3 sess ions ( see Table 5 ) , where appropriate 
F - te s ts are highly s i gnificant . 
In the W=3 , N=3 , C=l . O  treatment , the median subj ect always contributed .  
Mos t  groups in that treatment achieved nearly perfect cooperation . S ome 
groups failed to coordinate; subj ects in those groups typically had 
contribution rates near zero . On the other hand , the "no contribution" 
equil ibrium was never reached . Although contribution tended to diminish over 
time in groups that had not coordinated , sporadic contributions continued .  
These sporadic contributions lowered efficiency , particularly in the 8 groups 
that always or nearly always failed to obtain three contributions in a round . 
For W=3 , N=3 , C=l . 5 ,  most subj ects contributed very l ittl e , but a few 
subj ects had very high contribution rates . While some groups coordinated 
sporadically , no group sus tained coordination throughout the experiment , and 
some groups did fully or nearly lock in on everyone always keeping . 
Table 5 shows . .. that aggregate spending rates for s ome parameters are 
quite dis tant from either the Bayes ian or optimal symmetric predictions . For 
example , for W=3 , N=3 , C=l . 5 there is subs tantial spending in one shot 
scenarios where the Bayes prediction is for no spending ( zero cutpoint ) . 
However , the spenders tend to have low token values . Thus , these individual 
deviations in spending lead to relatively small deviations from the predicted 
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level of aggregate earnings . [Table 5 about here J 
Strate gie s 
Dominance 
Our first hypothes is concerning s trategies (H8) s tated that dominated 
strategies would not be used in one shot s ituations . This , as shown in Table 
6 ,  is supported._ A dominated ·�sJ::rate.gy was _used .only in under 2 percent of 
the possible opportunities . In contras t ,  dominated strategies should be used 
often in rotation schemes and even in the optimal symme tric cutpo int
strategies . While they were used more in repeated play than in random 
groups , they were used much less , if at all , than might be expected in these 
cooperative schemes ( see the s tatistical tests in Table 6 ) . 
Indeed , the only cases where we observe full coordination of some 
groups is where both unanimity is required and all endowments are below the 
value of the public good . Thus , achieving efficiency apparently depends no t 
j us t  on having a unique efficient equilibrium . It  also depends on no t having 
a temptation to defect in the current period . [Table 6 about here J
When the endowments can be very large , the C=2 . 2 5  cas e , we observe 
almost no contribution when subj ects have endowments greater than the value 
of the pub l ic good . Indeed there is little difference compared with random 
groups . 
For more moderate endowments , C=l . 5 ,  contributions of tokens over the 
endowment level is greater than with random groups ( again see the tests in 
Table 6 ) , but remains very small . In the 1 of 3 case , there are 5 
contributions for fixed groups , whereas none should occur with the optimal 
symmetric cutpo int . The five contributions were made by j us t  2 of the 
subj ects , one of whom was someone who tried a ro tation strategy , contributing 
on rounds 1 ,  4 ,  7 ,  etc . 
In the 2 0£ 3 and 3 of 3 experiments for C=l . 5 ,  there should be 
subs tantial contribution from subj ects with token values above the public 
good value . While far more contributions occur here than with random groups , 
the level is still less than one - fourth of the theoretical leve l . 
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The Use of Cutpoint Strategies 
The most s triking feature of individual behavior is the extens ive use of 
cutpo int decis ion rules by subj ects to decide when to spend and when to keep . 
Table 7 shows how pervas ive these s trategies are , lending s trong support for 
H9. That table reports the class ification errors that result if one chooses , 
for each individual , the cutpo int that would minimize the total number of 
clas s i fication errors in that group . We also report results i f  we impose the 
restriction that all individuals.in.a .sess ion use the same cutpo int rule ( the 
rows marked " sess ion" in Table 7 ) . For the repeated sess ions we report 
clas s ification errors under the weaker restriction that all members of the 
same group use the same cutpoint rule ( the rows marked " group " ) . [Table 7 about here] 
On average , we are able to as s ign a cutpo int to an individual and 
correctly clas s i fy nearly 9 5 %  of the spending decisions . 2 0  The low s tandard 
deviations for the averages show that there are few individuals who are 
clas s i fied very poorly . 
In the repeated game treatment , we clas s i fy groups nearly as wel l  as we 
do individuals , even though we buy back two or three degrees of freedom . 
This suggests that members of groups tend to adopt s imilar cutpo int 
s trategies . Except in the unanimity (W=3 , N=3 ) games , there is also l ittle 
deterioration in fit if we ass ign a common cutpoint to the sess ion . 
sugges ts that group e ffects are weak except in unanimity games .  
This 
For the W=3 , N=3 games , results deteriorate sub stantially if a common 
cutpoint is ass igned to the sess ion . This i s  an indication of s trong group 
effects . Particularly with C=l , groups bifurcate into groups that almost 
always produce the good and groups that almost never produce the goo d .  
The clas s i fication analys is is s imilar in the one - shot treatments except 
that there is a less marked deterioration in fit when the e s timated cutpoints 
are cons trained to be the same for all subj ects in a s e s s ion . An exception 
to thi s  i s  the W=3 , N=3 , C=l condition for random groups , where only 74% of 
spending decis ions . .  can be .accounted for us ing a common cutpoint for each 
sess ion . 
In .this case , in addition to the s table zero equil ibrium , there is an 
uns tab l e  e qui l ib rium where subj ects all contribute . The 41 percent 
contrib ut ion rate suggests that some subj ects made (unrewarded) efforts to 
bt . h h" h "b . i l"b . 2 1  0 1 h o ain t e ig contri ution equ i rium . ur resu ts sugges t  t at 
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repetition allows some , but not all groups , to arrive at this equilibrium . 
On the other hand , members of groups that fail do not "was te " the ir tokens as 
frequently as partic ipants in random group sess ions . 
The compar ison of the cons trained and unconstrained clas sification 
analys is provides a partial answer to HlO ( symmetry) . While there is 
apparently some variation in the specific cutpoint strategies individuals 
pursue , this variation is not large in magnitude , except in the unanimity 
games . This is al so reflected in the standard deviation of the estimated 
cutpo ints reported _in _Table_.3 • .  .As .hy.p.othesized , .there is more heterogene ity 
in the repeated- game condition than in the one - shot condition . 
The hypothes is (Hll) that cutpoints are wel l - predicted by the Bayes ian 
Nash equil ibrium is reasonably wel l  supported in the one - sho t condition , with 
one caveat . For the parametric treatments in this paper average estimated 
cutpo ints are sys tematically above the Bayes ian equi librium predict ion . ( See 
Table 3 . )  There are a number of possible explanations for this , which are 
exp lored in Palfrey and Rosenthal ( 19 9 lb ) . 
In the repeated- game condition , average es timated cutpo ints are even 
higher . In Table 3 we pres ent significance tests of the null hypothesis that 
the mean cutpo ints are equal in the two conditions vs . the alternative that 
cutpoints are greater in the repeated condition than in the one shot . Four 
of the s ix parameter sets show a s tatistically significant difference . The
small differences for the other two sets ( in one case oppos i te to the 
theoretical prediction) are not s ignificant . Overall , the estimated 
cutpo ints in the repeated condition are closer to the levels represented by 
Hl4. 
Finally , there is little support for the hypothesis that in the repeated 
game subj ects divide into activis ts , who always contribute , and free - riders , 
who never contribute in either the W=l condition or the W=2 condi tions . In 
the W=l and W=2 treatments , none of the subj ects were activists in always 
contributing in rounds 6 - 20 and only 2 subj ects were free - riders in that 
they never contributed . In fact only 12 of the 144 W=l and W=2 subj ects 
contributed two .or .fewer t-imes in r<mnds 6 - 2 0 . The two pure free riders did 
no t succeed in "b luffing " the other members of the ir groups into high 
contribution rates . One free rider was in a 1 of 3 game , the o ther in a 2 of 
4 .  The remaining subj ects contributed at rates far below that expected in 
either the symme tric group optimal reduced game ( 1  of 2 or 2 of 3 )  and , a 
fortiori ,  what would be optimal for the ent ire group , including the free 
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rider Thus there is l ittle support for Hl 3. To the extent that 
. . . d2 2  . t th t heterogene i ty in cutpoints existe , it was no at ex reme . 
Rotation 
As dis cus sed previous ly , the rotation model finds no support in the 
analys is o f  effic iency . Here we inves tigate to what extent some individual 
subj ects may be adopting rotation s trategies, To check for the s imp lest 
forms of rotation . by . specific .... individuals . , we looked for the following 
patterns for each subj ect in each experiment , with 11 II indicating 
indefinite repetition , S indicating spending , and K indicating keep ing. 
W=3, N=3 W=l ,N=3 W=2,N=3 W=2,N=4 
s .. . SKK . .  . SSK . .  . SSKK . .  . 
K . .  . KSK . .  . SKS . .  . SKSK . .  . 
KKS . .  . KSS . .  . SKKS . .  . 
KSSK . • .
KSKS . .  . 
KKSS . .  . 
For e ach subj ect , we computed the number of correct clas s ifications of 
their spending decis ions for each of the above patterns . We then ascribed to 
each subj ect the maximum classification accuracy over the relevant poss ible 
patterns . 
We performed the analys is for all rounds , rounds 1 - 20 ,  and rounds 6 - 20 .  
We carried out the analysis o f  all patterns for each experiment because it is 
pos s ible , especially with the rounds 6 - 20 analys is , that a high degree of 
clas s ificat ion can be achieved by fortuitous cycles of randomly drawn token 
values . 
Table 8 reports , over all rounds and experiments , the results for the 
bes t  fitting rotating scheme and the results for the marginals , and clearly 
shows that subj ects did not use rotation s trategies . 2 3  Only in the W=3 , N=3 , 
C=l . 0  game s , where rotation coincides with optimal symmetric cutpoint 
strategies , does t:he. rotation .model work . In that case , S . . .  ( a  degenerate 
form of rotation) does quite wel l . In fact , the median clas sification 
percentage i s  100 . 00 , showing that subj ects typically contribute from the 
beginning o f  the experiment to the end . [Table 8 about here] 
We als o  checked whether speci fic individuals rotated . We identified 
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all individuals whose spending dec isions could be correctly class ified 80 
percent or better with the rotation model . 
finding rotation , s ince 2 0  percent error 
analys is . 
Us ing 80 percent is tilted toward 
is quite high for the cutpo int 
For the W=2 N=4 sess ions , we found only 1 of 12 subj ects 
rotating ( classified at 8 7 %  in rounds 6 - 20 and 80% for all rounds ) .
close to 
In the 
W=2 N=3 sess ions , we found only 4 of 9 6  subj ects at 80 % or better in rounds 
6 - 2 0 . Of these 4 subj ects , only the perfect rotator mentioned earlier 
bettered 8 0  percent. £or .al l..r.ounds . .  ln .the .W=l , N=3 condi tion , we found only 
5 of 3 6  at 80%  or better in rounds 6 - 20 .  Only 1 of these 5 ( again a perfect 
rotator )  be ttered 80 percent for all rounds . 
true rotation . 
There was scant evidence for 
Behavior was more sys tematic in the W=3 , N= 3 experiments , where no true 
rotation was required .  With C = 1 ,  48 o f  6 9  subj ects contributed at leas t 80 
percent of the time , and 10 of the remaining 2 1  contributed no more than 2 0  
percent of the time over rounds 6 - 20 .  With C = 1 . 5 ,  2 2  of 42 never 
contributed more than 20 percent of the time , and 9 of the remaining 20 
contributed at least in 8 0  percent of the rounds . 
The two cases of perfect rotation we encountered , one in a W=l , N=3 game 
and the other in a W=2 , N=3 game , in fact involved the same subj ect , subj ect 
#3 in the 25 July 1 9 8 9  session . The first treatment in this triple session 
was the 1 of 3 game . 
The entire history of the repeated game played by this subj ect ' s  group 
is given in Figure 3 .  This game lasted for 2 1  rounds . The other two subj ects 
essent ially used a common cutpo int rule for a total of 2 errors in 42 
decisions . The publ ic good was produced in all but 6 of the 2 1  rounds . Thus 
the rotator did not have a s trong incentive to deviate from rotation . 
The next treatment of this triple sess ion was W=2 , N=3 , C = 2 .  2 5 . 
Subj ect #3 continued to rotate , contributing on rounds 3 ,  4 ,  6 ,  7 ,  9 ,  10 , etc . 
Ro tation was reinforced by the fact that the good was produced frequently at 
the beginning of the experiment and that subj ect #3 drew low token value s 
whenever it was "his turn" from rounds 1 8  onward . On the other hand , when 
25 
the experiment ended 
The failure to 
the good had been produced [Figure 3 about here . ]
produce the good frequently 
in only 12 o f  27 rounds . 
in the second sess ion perhaps 
underlies subj ect #3 becoming a cutpoint player in the last game of this 
session , W=2 , N=3 , C=2 . 2 5 .  Us ing a cutpoint of 41 franc s for #3 results in 
only 2 clas s i fication errors over all 61 rounds . Rotation requires 
contribution on two success ive rounds . This happened only once , when 3 '  s 
token values were very low . 
6 .  Conclusion 
Mos t  o f  the theoretical hypotheses were supported to some degree in the 
data . Repetition leads to more cooperative behavior (more spending) and 
improves efficiency , and better monitoring appears to have a s imilar effec t .  
Game theory can account for many of the qualitative features of the data , 
particularly in the one shot games . Subj ects avoid dominated s trategies and 
adhere to cutpo int dec is ion rules that are , on average , very close to the 
ones predicted by Bayes ian equil ibrium . 
On the other hand , subj ects are unable to come even close to fully 
exploiting the opportunities for coordination and cooperation in the repeated 
games . The only environment where full efficiency is achieved is in the 
unanimi ty games which actually have a one - shot Bayesian equil ibrium ( albeit 
uns table ) which yields full efficiency . 
Thus , while the theory correctly predicts the qualitative e ffects of 
repetition , the observed magnitudes are much smaller than predicted . We 
conj ecture that one reason for this is that the theory l acks a good dynamic 
model o f  how players might reach an efficient equil ibrium in a repeated 
game . This vo id in the theory is particularly evident when one cons iders 
rotation s chemes , which are non - s tationary and require a specific t iming 
s tructure . In order £or such s chemes to ever come about , players in a group 
will have to go through some sort of " groping about" process in the early 
plays o f  the game , remini scent of the process modeled by Crawford and Haller 
( 19 9 0 ) . Apparently even relatively s imple rotation s chemes are very 
difficult to support , and unlikely to emerge spontaneously without explicit 
coordination devices , such as direct or mediated communicat ion . We found 
2 6  
essentially no evidence at all for impl icit coordination of this sort . 
Unanimity games are the only ones where a grop ing s tage is not 
necessary . However ,  even in unanimity games , many groups fail to coordinate , 
with success or failure largely de termined in the early plays of the game . 
Again , this indicates a need to mode l the dynamic p rocess of how players 
adj ust their behavior over the course of the repeated plays of the game . Yet 
a s triking feature of the behavior disp layed in the experiments is the 
apparent use of heuristic cutpoints by the subj ects . The high rates of 
c lass i£ication . . .succe s s  .we .ob tained suggests . that , . after some initial rounds , 
individual behavior is highly stable . At the same time , group behavior is 
highly variable , particularly in the unanimity games with C=l where groups 
b i furcated into fully cooperating groups and " failed" groups . 
perspective , the interes ting dynamics may be packed into 
experiences of groups . 
2 7  
From this 
the initial 
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1 see Fudenberg and Tirole , 1991 , ch . 5 ,  for an extens ive bibliography 
2This dates back to work in the 5 0 ' s and 60 ' s on repeated bimatrix games , 
which is surveyed in Rapoport and Orwant [ 1962 ] and Gallo and McCl intock 
[ 1 9 6 5 ) . Mo st of that research did no t use financ ial incentives to induce the 
payoff matrices . More recently , there has been extens ive work on fini tely 
repeated games of cooperation in many settings , including public goods 
provi s ion ( Isaac and Walker [ 19 9 1 )  and the art icles they cite )  ol igopoly 
games ( Friedman [ 1 9 6 7 , 196 9 ) , Alger [ 1 9 8 7 ) , Davis and Holt [ 1 9 90 ) , common pool 
resource usage (Walker , Os trom and Gardner [ 19 9 0 )  and Os trom and Walker 
( 1 99 1 ) ) and other se ttings . 
3s ince we began running the experiments reported here , there has been a 
flurry of independent experimental research aimed at compar ing one - shot play 
and repeated play in prisoner dilemma games and related environments .  This 
includes work by Pri sbrey ( 19 9 1 ) , Cooper et al . ( 1 9 9 1 ) , Andreoni and Miller 
( 1 99 1 ) , and McCabe et al . ( 19 91 ) . The only earlier work we are aware of that 
was explici tly des igned for a one - shot vs . repeated game comparison is by 
Andre oni [ 1 9 8 8 ) ,  who uses random matching schemes to emulate one - shot 
vo luntary contribut ion games . His findings , based on a relatively small 
sample , are anomalous in that the one sho t games he investigated led to 
greater coope ration than the ir finitely repeated counterparts . 
4see , for example , Selten and S toecker [ 19 8 8 ) for evidence about the terminal 
period of a fini tely repeated pris oners ' di lemma game , or Isaac , Walker , and 
Thomas ( 1 9 8 4 )  and subsequent work on fini tely repeated voluntary contribut ion 
games . 
SM . ost auc tion experiments have not used matching schemes .
6 Ostrom 
overcome 
vers ions 
ro tat ion 
( 1 9 9 0 )  emphas izes the enormous variety of ways groups find to 
the se free rider/coordination problems in naturally occurring 
of the related " commons " problem . These include examp les of 
schemes that she has documented ,  as well as other 
arrangements . 
7Three of the nine - subj ect sess ions were run as s ingle sess ions , rather than 
as tr iple sess ions . 
30 
8 Four o f  the sess ions used 9 subj ects . These exceptions are no ted in Table 1 .
9Appendix A contains a copy of the ins tructions for one of the sess ions . 
lONo subj ect asked what we would have done if hours had passed and a 4 had no t 
yet been rolled.  Luckily the longest repeated game lasted for 6 7  periods . 
No triple session las ted more than two hours . 
11we sometime s refer to i ' s token value as i ' s  contribution cost . 
12we use the terms " spend" and " contribute"  interchangeably .  
experiment , we us ed the more neutral " spend/keep " termino logy . 
1 3 8 ee also Fudenberg and T irole ( 19 9 0  pp . 2 11 - 2 1 3 ) . 
In the actual 
14The analys is in this sect ion does not apply in a natural way to the W=3 , N=3 
games , where the optimal solution is clearly for everyone to contribute . 
15 In the " no reveal " treatment , this kind of arrangement cannot be supported 
as a noncooperative equil ibrium becaus e of monitoring problems . 
16 In the W=l , N=3 games , the W=2 , N=4 games , and the W=2 , N=3 , C=l . 5  games ,
the optimal asymme tric solution gives the same expected group payoff as the 
rotation scheme . 
1 7  Table 2 shows the expected group earnings (net of endowment ) for each of
parame ter sets in the one - shot equi l ibrium compared to the optimal symme tric 
cutpoint s trategies . 
1 3rnc lus ion o f  later rounds in the repeated- game sess ions produces s imilar 
results . Table 5 gives an indicat ion o f  the small magni tude of the 
differences depending on whether one uses all rounds or only rounds 6 - 20 .  
1 9s ee Table 2 .  Ano ther comparison of the degree to which the game is 
competitive is s imply to note that of all the games , the W=l , N=3 game i s  the 
only one in which there are no gains to preplay communication , or cheaptalk . 
In the other games , cheaptalk can lead to Pareto improving equilibria 
( Palfrey and Rosenthal [ 19 9 la] ) .  
2 0  Of course , more than 5 0 %  correct clas s i fication is guarantee d ,  even if 
subj ects choose randomly . But Monte Carlo results in Palfrey and Ros enthal 
( 19 9 l a )  indicate overwhelming rej ection of chanc e mode ls for the levels of 
clas s ification reported here . '  
2 1one subj ect , who had repeatedly spent his token , spontaneous ly remarke d ,  
while be ing paid , that h e  could not understand why the other subj ects had 
been " s o  irrational " .  
2 2Th F . T b l  3 . d '  . . . . f h d e - te s ts in a e in icate more variation in cutpoints or t e repeate 
condi tion in three of the s ix parameter conditions . 
2 3The results were s imi lar for the rounds 1 - 20 and 6 - 20 analys is . The results 
are the same if one takes the class i fication percentage s imply over all 
dec i s ions rather than averaging the percentages for the subj ects . The 
large s t  difference in these two percentages is 2 . 0 % . The choice of the "best 
fi tting " mode l was who lly insens it ive to the use of either average o r  the 
median . 
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TABLE lA 
DES CRIPTION OF RANDOM GROUP EXPERIMENTS 
Date S it e  w N Range C ents c Subj s .  Rounds Reveal S equence 
7/13/88 CIT 1 3 90 0 . 5 1 . 5 1 2  30 No 
2/15/89 CMU 1 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 1 2  20 No 2 
2/16/89 CMU 1 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 12 20 No 2 
7/31/89 CIT 1 3 9 0  0 . 3 1 .  5 12 20 No 2 
8/8/8 9 CIT 1 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 1 2  1 8  Yes 2 
1/2 2/87 CIT 2 3 9 0  1 1 .  5 9 20 No 
1 2/3/87 CIT 2 3 90 1 1 .  5 9 2 0  No 
1 2/20/87 CIT 2 3 90 1 1 .  5 9 20 N o  
2/15/89 CMU 2 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 1 2  2 0  No 1 
2/16/89 CMU 2 3 90 0 . 3 1 . 5 1 2  2 0  No 3 
7/31/89 CIT 2 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 1 2  20 N o  1 
8/8/8 9 CIT 2 3 90 0 , 3 1 .  5 1 2  2 0  Yes 1 
4/2 7/89 CMU 2 3 90 0 . 7  2 . 2 5 1 2  20 N o  1 
5/2/89 CMU 2 3 90 0 . 7 2 . 2 5 1 2  20 No 3 
8/3/8 9 CIT 3 3 204 0 . 1 . 9 9 5  1 2  2 5  No 1 
9/4/9 1 C IT 3 3 204 0 . 1 . 9 9 5  1 2  20 N o  1 
7/21/88 CIT 3 3 9 0  0 . 5 1 .  5 1 2  30 No 
2/15/89 CMU 3 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 12 2 0  No 3 
2/16/89 CMU 3 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 1 2  2 0  No 1 
7/26/89 CIT 2 4 2 04 0 . 1 2 . 2 2 1 2  17 No 1 
7/31/89 CIT 2 4 90 0 . 3 2 . 2 5 12 2 0  No 3 
8/8/8 9 C IT 2 4 90 0 . 3 2 . 2 5 1 2  20 Yes 3 
3.2 
TABLE l B  
DES CRIPTION OF REPEATED GROUP EXPERIMENTS 
Date w N Range Cents c Subj s .  Rounds Revea l  S equence 
7/2 5/89 1 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 . 5 12 2 1  No 1 
8/9/8 9 1 3 90 0 . 3 1 .  5 12 2 0  Yes 2 
7/2 7/89 1 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 . 5 12 47 Yes 3 
7/2 5/89 2 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 . 5 12 27 No 2 
7/27/8 9 2 3 .204 . 0 . 1 1 . 5 .12 34 Yes 1 
7/2 7/89 2 3 204 0 . 1 1 .  5 1 2  2 9* No 2 
8/2/8 9 2 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 .  5 12 22 No 1 
8/2/89 2 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 . 5 1 2  6 7* Yes 2 
8/2/ 8 9  2 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 .  5 12 2 0  No 3 
8/9/8 9 2 3 9 0  0 . 3 1 . 5 12 20 Yes 1 
7/25/89 2 3 2 04 0 . 1 2 . 2 2 12 61 N o  3 
8/3/ 8 9  3 3 2 04 0 . 1 . 9 9 5  1 2  2 0  No 2 
8/3/8 9 3 3 2 04 0 . 1 . 9 9 5  1 2  3 1  Yes 3 
6/11/91 3 3 2 04 0 . 1 . 9 9 5  9 2 0  Yes 1 
9/4/ 9 1  3 3 2 04 0 . 15 . 9 9 5  1 2  3 0  No 2 
10/2 9/91 3 3 2 04 0 . 12 . 9 9 5  1 2  2 0  No 2 
10/2 9/91 3 3 2 04 0 . 12 . 9 9 5  1 2  2 9  Ye s 3 
6/11/91 3 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 . 5 9 2 7  Yes 2 
6/11/ 9 1  3 3 2 04 0 . 1 1 .  5 9 2 0  Ye s 3 
9/4/9 1 3 3 2 04 0 . 15 1 . 5 1 2  2 0  No 3 
10/2 9/91 3 3 2 04 0 . 12 1 .  5 12 34 No 1 
8/9/8 9 2 4 90 0 . 3 2 . 2 5 1 2  2 0  No 3 
3 3  
No tes to Tab l e  1 .
Francs - This gives the upper end of the uniform ( in integers ) dis tribution 
of endowments in francs . This number and c can be used to calculate the 
franc value of the public benefi t ,  B = Franc s/c . 
Cents - The number of cents paid per franc earned in the experiment . 
Subj ects - The number of subj ects in the experiment . 
Rounds The number of (non -practice ) rounds for the given (w , N ,  
c ) parameters . After the first 2 0  rounds , a ten s ided di was tossed to see i f  
the game continued . The stopping probabil ity was 0 . 1 .  
Reveal - When this parameter is "Yes " ,  all token values were revealed after 
each round . S ubj ects could match the individual token value s and the 
dec i s ions of the other members of their group . Otherwise , token values were 
not reveale d .  
Sequence - Only one s e t  of subj ects was run o n  a given date . Subj ects played 
three sets of parameters in sequence . The sequence shows the order in whi ch 
the parameters were use d .  Some subj ects were also used in experiments were 
groups were reformed at random on each round . This explains why only two 
sets o f  parameters are shown for the 9/4/91 and 8/3/8 9 experiments . 
S ite - All of the sess ions in Table lB were conducted at the CIT s ite . The 
sess ions conducted on 9/4/91 used students enrolled at Pas adena Community 
College . Some of the 1989  CIT sess ions included some subj ects who were 
enrolled in a special summer program for high school s tudents . 
Other - The second sess ion on 7/27/89 ended because of an unexpected computer 
crash following round 2 9 . The second sess ion on 8/2/89 had a computer crash 
in the eighth round , but was res tarted and eventually lasted a total of 6 7  
rounds . All three sess ions on 8/9/89 were terminated immediately after round 
20 , without rolling a die . 
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TABLE 2 .  
THEORETICAL ANALYSI S  RESULTS FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
TREATMENT 
PARAMETERS : N 3 3 3 3 3 4 
K 1 2 2' 3 3 2 
c 1 .  5 1 . 5 2 . 2 5 1 1 .  5 2 . 2 5 
Bayes One Shot 
Symmetric 
Cutpoints 0 . 47 0 . 3 8 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 30 
Group Optimal 
Symmetric Cutpo ints 0 . 75 1 . 13 1 . 41 1 .  0 1 .  5 1 .  2 7  
Earnings i f  
Endowments Kept 0 . 75 0 . 7 5 1 . 13 0 . 5 0 . 75 1 . 13 
Earnings for 
Bayes One Shot 1 .  3 5  0 . 8 6 1 . 13 0 . 5 0 . 7 5 1 . 19 
Symmetric 
Earnings for 
Group Optimal 1 . 44 1 . 17 1 . 20 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 48 
Symmetric 
Earnings for 1 . 5 1 . 2 5 1 .  7 5  1 .  0 1 . 0 2 . 13 
Optimal Rotation 
No t e  to Tabl e  2 .
All computations with value of benefit (pub l ic good) equal to 1 . 0 .
3 5  
TABLE 3. 
SUMMARY OF REPEATED VS . FIXED GROUP COMPARISONS 
TREATMENT 
PARAMETERS : N 3 3 3 3 3 4 
K 1 2 2 3 3 2 
c 1. 5 1. 5 2. 2 5  1 1. 5 2. 2 5
EQUILIBRIUM c* . 47 - . 37 0 0 0 . 3  
PREDI CT I ONS : O S  c* . 7 5 1. 13 . 94 1 1. 5 1. 2 7co 
q* . 3 1 . 25 0 0 0 . 13 O S  
q* . 5 . 75 . 62 1 1 . 5 7 co 
OBS ERVATIONS : c . 50 . 5 5 . 34 . 42 . 34 . 60 
OS *** ** *** ** 
c . 48 . 6 8 . 5 6 . 7 3 . 6 0 . 60 co 
a . 2 3 . 2 2 . 2 1 . 24 . 2 9 . 2 7 
O S  . 29 t t  . 34 t . 54t t ta . 2 5 . 2 3 . 2 6 co 
q o s . 2 8 . 3 5 . 18 . 42 . 2 5 . 2 2 
qco . 34 . 44 . 2 8 . 77 . 41 . 24 
n 60 7 5  24 24 3 6  3 6  
O S  
n 3 6  8 4  12 6 9  42 12 co 
,, 0. 84 0. 40 0. 08 - 0. 18 - 0. 2 9  0 . 3 6 O S  
,, co 0. 8 2 0. 5 2 0. 3 7  0. 5 9 - 0 . 04 0. 48
No tes to Tabl e  3 .
The sub s cripts os and co refer to the one - shot tre atment an� the
repeated- group treatment , respec tively . The reported values of c are 
computed as the ave rage of the cutpo ints that are e s t imated for e ach 
individual . Each o f  the s e  was e s t imated by finding the hyp o the ti cal cutp o int 
that minimized the clas s i fication errors of a subj ec t ' s  contribution 
dec i s ions . The reported values of � are the averages that appear in Tab l e  4. 
The reported values o f  a are computed as the s tandard deviation o f  the 
individual e s t imated cutp o ints . The reported values o f  n are the numbe r  o f  
individuals who part i c ipated i n  that treatment . The reported values o f  YJ ,
the efficiency measure , is the total payoff to the subj ects in exc e s s  o f  
the i r  endowments ,  normalized s o  that e arnings e qual to the endowments have Y/ 
= 0 and e arnings predicted by the optimal symme tric cutpo int have Y/ = 1 .
Signifi cance tes ts . S e e  notes to Table 5 for parallel de scrip t ion and 
exp l anat ion . 
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TABLE 4 
DEVIATION OF SESS ION EARNINGS FROM THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
Random Groups 
Model 
One Shot Optimal Ro tate 
*
RMS E  0 . 08 7  0 . 2 9 5  0 . 3 2 5  
Ave . Dev . - 0 . 020 0 . .26l . 0_ 302 
No t es to Tab l e  4 .
* Roo t  Mean S quare Error . 
All predict ions c al culated as suming 
dec i s i on rule s  given the i r  ac tual token 
averaged over a l l  p o s s ib l e  ro tation s cheme s . 
each p layer i s  allowed to b e  the c ontributor 
Units of analys i s  are s e s s ions . 
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Fixed Groups 
Model 
One Shot Opt imal Ro t ate 
0 . 2 1 3  0 . 2 2 6  0 . 25 9  
- 0 . 12 9  0 . 194 0 . 2 3 1  
subj ects fo l l owed theoretical 
value s . Ro tat ion predictions 
( Fo r  example , in 1 of 3 game s , 
on Round 1 . )  
TABLE 5
CONTRIBUTION RATES 
N 3 3 3 3 3 4 
TREATMENT K 1 2 PARAMETERS : 
2 3 3 2 
c 1 .  s 1 .  s 2 . 2S 1 1 .  s 2 . 2 S 
Rounds 6 - 20 * *** ** *** ** 
Average repeated - - . 34 - . 44 * * *  . 2 8 * . 7 7 * * * . 41 * * *  . 24 one - shot . 2 8 * . 3 S . 18 . 42 . 2 S . 2 2 
Std . Dev . repeated . 16 . 16 . 10 . 34 t . 3 7
t t t  . lS
one - shot . 13 . 14 . 11 . 2 1 . 16 . 1 1 
All Rounds *** *** ** 
Average repeated . 3 3 * . 44 * * *  . 2 3 * . 7 6  * *  * . 3 8 * * *  
. 2 6 
one - shot . 2 9 . 3 S . 18 . 43 . 2 S . 24 
Std . Dev . repeated . ls . 14t t . 10 . 3 3 t t . 3 l t t t  . 12 
one - shot . 14 . 10 . 09 . 1 9 . lS . 10 
No tes to Tab l e  5 .
Average refers to the percentage of tokens that were contr ibuted for all 
subj ects in a given treatment . The s tandard deviations ( S td .  D ev . ) are 
computed by calculating a spending rate (proportion of tokens contributed) 
for each subj ect in a treatment , and then computing the s tandard deviation of 
these individual spending rates . 
Signifi cance tes ts . 
The null hypothesis that the variance across subj ects was equal in the 
two treatments vs . the alternative that the repeated variance was greater 
than the one - shot was tested by a s tandard F- tes t .  The null hypothes is that 
the mean across subj ects was equal in the two treatments vs . the alternative 
that the mean contribution rate was higher in repeated groups was tested by a 
s tandard t - test that allows for unequal variances . Us ing individual 
decis ions rather than subj ects as the units of observation , we also carr ied 
out the s tandard like lihood- ratio test of the null hypothesis that there was 
an equal contribution probability in the two populations . Because the 
effective number of observations was much higher in this test than in the 
t - test , p -values were lower for this test than for the t - test . 
* One - tailed t - :test . (unequal variances ) p -value :SO . OS .
** One - tailed t - test (unequal variances ) p -value :SO . 01 .
*** One - tailed t - test (unequal variances ) p -value :SO . 001 . 
t F - tes t  p -value :SO . OS .
t t F - tes t  p -value :S0 . 01 .
t t t  F - test p -value :S0 . 00 1 . 
* Likelihood- ratio test p-value :S0 . 01
* * *  Likelihood- ratio test p -value :SO . 001 . 
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TABLE 6. 
ENDOWMENTS AT LEAST EQUAL TO BENEFIT : C ONTRIBUTIONS AND THEORY 
Rounds 6 - 2 0 
TREATMENT 
PARAMETERS : N 
K 
c 
Repeated Groups 
Actual Spends 
Theoretical Spends 
To tal Observations 
One - Shot Groups 
Actual Spends 
Theoretical Spends 
Total Observations 
No tes to Tab l e  6 .
3 
1 
1 .  5 
5 
oa
1 6 0  
3n 
0 
3 1 6  
3 
2 
1 . 5
2 3  
u s
*** 
420 
g t  
0 
408 
3 
2 
2 . 2 5 
1 
3 0
*** 
9 2  
4n 
0 
2 1 6  
3 
3 
1 
n . a .
n . a .
n . a .
n . a .
n . a .
n . a . 
3 
3 
1 .  5 
5 3  
2 2 2
*** 
2 2 2  
g t t t  
0 
1 8 8  
4 
2 
2 . 2 5 
0 
3 2  
*** 
101 
Sn 
0 
3 0 9  
The theoretical spends are calculated on the predictions of the 
symmetric cooperative cutpoint equilibrium for fixed groups and the actual 
token values used in the experiment . ( For random groups , the non- cooperative 
prediction is always "keep " for endowments at least equal to the value of the 
benefit . )  
*** The l ikel ihood- ratio test that the actual spends were at a rate 
equal to the theoretical predict ion was rej ected at the . 001 level or 
a The test was not performed because the theoretical level is 0 .
t 
spending 
one - shot 
t t t
n 
was smal l  
The l ikel ihood- ratio test of the hypothesis  that the probab il ity of 
a token at least equal to the benefit was equal in the repeated and 
treatments was rej ected at the 0 . 0 5 leve l . 
The hypothesis  is rej ected at the 0 . 00 1  leve l . 
The tes t  was not carried out because the number o f  actual spends 
in both treatments . 
3 9  
Rounds 6 - 20 
TREATMENT 
PARAMETERS : 
Fixed Groups 
N 
K 
c 
Average - - - S e s s ion 
Group 
Subj ect 
Std . Dev . - Sess ion 
Group 
Subj ect 
Random Groups 
Average - - - Se s s ion 
Subj ect 
S td .  Dev . - Sess ion 
Subj ect 
TABLE 7 
PERCENT CORRECTLY CLASS IFIED 
3 
1 
1 .  5 
8 2  
8 6  
9 2  
2 
5 
8 
8 7  
9 5  
4 
6 
3 
2 
1 .  5 
84 
87 
92 
4 
8 
11 
8 8  
94 
4 
6 
3 
2 
2 . 2 5 
8 8  
90 
9 3  
n . a .
6 
7 
8 8  
9 4  
4 
8 
3 
3 
1 
8 1  
9 4  
96 
18 
8 
8 
74 
89 
0 . 4
10 
3 
3 
1 .  5 
7 6  
9 1  
9 7  
8 
9 
6 
8 5  
9 2  
6 
9 
4 
2 
2 . 2 5 
8 7  
9 0  
9 4  
n . a .
4 
7 
8 9  
9 4  
2 .  
6 
No te : " S ess ion" refers to the classification percentages that re sult when a 
common cutpo int is calculated for the 12 (or 9 )  subj ects in a g iven sess ion 
for the parameters . "Group " refers to a common cutpo int for all subj ects in 
a dis tinct group . " Subj ect"  refers to a cutpo int for each subj ect . 
Cutpoints were chosen to minimize classification errors . In computing the 
s tandard deviations , the unbiased estimator formula (divis ion by NOBS - 1 )  was 
use d .  The standard deviat ion for sess ions was computed with sess ions a s  the 
units of observation . Accordingly , '  " n . a . " is shown for treatments with only 
a s ingle session . 
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TABLE 8 .  RESULTS OF ROTATION ANALYS IS 
Marginals 
Percent 
Correctly 
C lass i fi ed , 
Averaged Over 
Subj ects 
S tandard 
Deviation 
Over Subj ects 
Median Percent , 
Over Subj ects 
Best Fitting Rotation 
Model 
Percent 
Correctly 
Clas s i fied , 
Averaged Over 
Subj ects 
S tandard 
Deviat ion 
Over Subj ects 
Median Percent , 
Over Subj ects 
Number of 
Subj ects 
Parameters 
3 of 3 3 of 3 '  2 of 3 2 of 3 2 of 4 1 of 3 
C=l . O  C=l . 5  C=l . 5  C=2 . 2 5 C=2 . 2 5 C=l . 5  
7 6 . l 6 1 . 8 5 6 . 4 7 6 . 6 74 . 1 6 6 . 8
3 3 . 1 3 1 . 3 1 3 . 9 10 . 5 1 2 . 0 15 . 2
100 . 0  7 3 . 3  5 8 . 9  7 3 . 8  7 5 . 0  6 6 . 7  
3 of 3 1 of 3 1 o f  3 1 of 3 1 o f  3 1 of 3 
7 6 . 1 60 . 8 6 1 . 7 6 3 . 2 6 6 . 7 6 3 . 2
3 3 . l 1 1 . 4 6 . 8 4 . 8 6 . 5 8 . 2
100 . 0 6 6 . 7 6 1 . 8 6 2 . 3 6 5 . 0 6 1 . 9
6 9 42 84 1 2  1 2  3 6  
Note . The .marginal model was Y for 3 of 3 ,  C = 1 .  0 ,  N for all other 
parameter sets . The best fitting rotation model was chosen from among the 
rotation mode ls of 1 of 3 ,  2 of 3 ,  3 o f  3 ,  and 2 o f  4 .  
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Figure 1 
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Session Earn ings, Fixed Groups
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One of Three Repeated No Reveal Games
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Appendix A .  Samp le Ins tructions ( from 10/2 9/91 sess ion) 
Decis ion-Making Experiment 
This is an experiment in decis ion making . You will be paid IN CASH at 
the end of the experiment . The amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
dec is ions you make and on the dec isions other people make . I t  is important 
that you do not talk at all or otherwise attempt to communicate with the 
other subj ects except according to the spec ific rules of the experiment . I f
you have a ques tion , feel free t o  raise your hand . One of u s  will come over 
to where you are s itting and answer your ques tion in private . 
This sess ion you are partic ipating in is broken down into a sequence of 
thre.e s ep arate .experiments . 
EXPERIMENT 1 :
This experiment is divided into many rounds , or periods . At the beginn ­
ing o f  this experiment , you are assigned to a group with 2 other persons . 
You will not be told which of the other people in the room are in your group . 
The other members of your group will s tay the s ame in every round of this 
experiment . Here are the rules that apply to every round of the experiment : 
Each round in the experiment you have a s ingle token to use in one of two 
ways : Option #1 : Spend the token . Option #2 : Keep the token . 
The amount of money you earn in a round depends upon whe ther you keep or 
spend your token that round and how many others in your group spend their 
token . All money is denominated in FRANCS . At the end of the experiment , 
you wil l  be paid $ . 12 for every 100 FRANCS you have accumulated during 
the cours e  of all three experiments . Before each round begins , you will be 
told how many FRANCS your token is worth if you do not spend it . This 
amount , called your TOKEN VALUE , will change from round to round and wil l  
vary from person t o  person randomly . T o  be more specific , i n  each round , 
this amount is equally likely to be anywhere from 1 to 204 FRANCS .  There 
is absolutely no sys tematic or intentional pattern to your token values or 
the token values of anyone else . The determination of token values across 
rounds and across people is entirely random . Therefore , everyone in your 
group will generally have different token values . Furthermore , these token 
values will change from period to period in a random way . You will be 
informed PRIVATELY what your new token value is at the b eginning of each 
round and you are not p ermitted to tell anyone what this amount i s . 
Specific ins tructions : 
At the s tart of each round you are told your token value for that round . 
After be ing told your token value , you mus t wait at least 10 seconds before 
making your decis ion to keep or spend . Your keyboard will be frozen for this 
period of time . After everyone in the room has made a decision ,  you are told 
which members of your group spent their token and what your earnings were for 
that round . You will never be told what the other members ' token values 
were . The experiment will last at least 20 rounds . Beginning in round 21 , 
we will roll a 10 - s ided die to determine whether to terminate the experiment 
or continue . We will terminate the experiment i f  and only if a 4 is rolled , 
otherwise we will conduct another round . This will continue until we roll a 
4 .  Your total earnings in dollars will be your accumulation of FRANCS multi ­
plied by the exchange rate of $ 0 . 12 = 100 FRANCS . [ Wr ite exchange rate on 
board . ] 
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PAYOFFS 
In each round , if all 3 members in your group choose to spend the ir 
token , every member in your group will each earn 136 FRANCS .  Otherwise , the 
spenders in your group earn 0 and the nonspenders in your group earn their 
token value . Each group is completely independent : WHAT HAPPENS IN YOUR 
GROUP HAS NO EFFECT ON THE PAYOFFS TO MEMBERS OF THE OTHER GROUPS AND VICE 
VERSA . Therefore , in each round , you have exactly three po ssible earnings . 
[write p ayoff matr ix on board and exp lain ] 
Earnings Table 
Your spending decision : Number of Others Spending : Your Earnings 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
[ Give quiz ] 
[ Two practice rounds . 
so . In round 1 ,  make 
Exp lain the displays 
EXPERIMENT 2 :
2 
0 or 1 
0 or 1 or 2 
Tell no one to press any 
everyone spend . In round 
and the his tory screen . ] 
136  FRANCS 
0 FRANCS 
Your Token Value 
keys unless instructed to do 
2 ,  make everyone keep . 
Thi s  is exactly the same as experiment 1 except for 2 things : 
1 .  You are assigned to a new group with 2 other persons in the room . Ne ither 
of the other members in your new group were in your group in the last 
experiment . This new group assignment is fixed and will remain the same in 
every round of this new experiment . 
2 .  If  everyone in your group spends the ir token in a round , then everyone in 
your group earns 205  FRANCS in that round ( ins tead of 1 3 6  in experiment 1 ) . 
[write new payo ff matrix on board , and explain . ]
[ No quiz or practice rounds ) 
EXPERIMENT 3 :
This is exactly the same as experiment 2 except for 2 things : 
1 .  You are reass igned to a completely different group . The other two persons 
in your group now are different from the other two persons in your group in 
either experiment 1 or experiment 2 .  This new group as signment is fixed and 
will remain the same in every round of this new experiment . 
2 .  At the end of each round , you are told what the token values of the other 
members of your group were in that round . 
[ No quiz or practice rounds ) 
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